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PROGRESS REPORT
ON
MARTIN'S TITAN III INCENTIVES
(JANUARY 1963 TO MARCH 1966)

The score to date is:
TABLE A.

Robert W. Chapman
Incentive Review Monitor
The Martin Company, Denver, Colorado

INCENTIVE PERT EVENT SCORING
Total Events
Scored

Events Approved
by the Monitors

1st thru llth Incentive
Quarters

297

265

32

12th Quarter (Current)

_5

_5

_0

302

270 (897.)

32 (HZ)

Total to Date

Three years ago Martin started work on the Phase
II contract for the development and test of the
Titan III Space Booster. This was the first
large aerospace system contract to incorporate
multiple incentives for schedule, cost, and
technical performance. Now, with the Titan III
contract more than 90% complete, this report
will evaluate the success of the incentives used
and will compare incentive success with program
results.

Events
Disapproved

The reasons for disapproval of the thirty-two
events fall into two categories:
TABLE B.

REASONS FOR IPE DISAPPROVAL

Time Category
(No. of IPE's Disapproved
____on a Time Basis)

In consonance with the philosophy that the
purpose of incentives is to motivate superior
performance, this Martin/AFSSD contract contains
definitive criteria for the determination of
incentive success or failure. The contract also
provides for a bilateral incentive monitoring
system and requires that this monitoring system
operate in a timely manner.-'- By this means,
performance is quantatively measured at
progressive check points throughout the period
of performance. The responsibility for meeting
the incentive criteria is assigned ahead of time
by Martin's program management to specific
individual work leaders whose success or failure
is graded virtually at the moment the work is
accomplished.

Quality Category
(No. of IPE's Disapproved on
a Quality/Technical Basis)

Total
Disapproved
IPE's

7 (227.)

32 (1007.)

25 (78Z)

Thus of the 302 IPE's scored to date: 25/302 or
8.2% were late; and 7/302 or 2.4% were deficient
in quality. (In each case, the disapproval
spurred appropriate recovery action — not early
enough to avoid the incentive penalty, but still
early enough to forestall serious downstream
impact.)
In selecting the IPE's both Martin and AFSSD
recognized the fact that success of the engineer
ing activities is a major factor in overall
program success. Engineering is "first-in-line".
It has to. define the hardware before procurement
or fabrication efforts can begin. Success in
motivating engineering to release complete
packages on time enables the procurement buyers
to shop more effectively, permits the tool
designers to more thoroughly explore alternate
producibility concepts, and lessens the produc
tion worker's rework and overtime. Further, we
believe that the incentives and other program
control techniques must be in dynamic operation
during the first 25% of the program, for that
is where the overall success or failure of the
program is established. Therefore, almost 40%
of the total number of IPE's were devoted to
engineering. The scoring of this coverage is
shown in the following table:

Schedule Performance
The prime schedule concern to the customer,
AFSSD, is that the boosters be ready at the
launch complex on the date scheduled for launch.
To ensure this capability the schedule incentive
is structured in two parts. One is the PERT/
Time incentive which motivates quality/time per
formance on critical events leading to completion
of the contract milestones. The second part of
the schedule incentive, the contract milestones,
requires the on- time completion of airborne
vehicle and AGE tests at Denver prior to shipment
to the launch sites.
PERT/Time Incentive 2

TABLE C.

The PERT/Time incentive consists of 316 Incentive
PERT Events (IPE's) which are listed in the
contract. The criteria used in selecting the
events used as IPE's is that they be significant,
definable, and capable of motivating performing
groups toward successful accomplishment of the
milestones and other program objectives. During
the last month of each three-month quarter, the
PERT/Time tab runs for the next quarter are
"frozen" by Martin and the Air Force through
their Incentive Review Monitors, and the
"expected date" (date for which there is a 50/50
probability of completing the event) is used to
measure the IPE's falling into that quarter.
Detailed descriptions of the events, their
criteria for quality/technical completion, and
expected dates are disseminated in a catalog.
The Monitors then use the Catalog description
and the "expected date" in scoring success or
failure.

ENGINEERING IPE PERFORMANCE

IPE Coverage*
of Basic
Design Packages

Total No.
of IPE's

No. of
Disapproved IPE's

7. IPE
Success

T-III A/B
Eng ineer ing

98*

987.

T-III AGE
Engineering

74Z

97Z

(*These percentages exclude any redundant events
such as "P-41 Umbilicals, Design Engineering
Release Complete" in which the drawings were
virtually identical to those in a similar and
earlier P-40 IPE. Since they offered little
motivation all redundant events were replaced
by other events which offered more challenge.
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In the fabrication area there have been 172
IPE's scored to date. These covered procure
ment, tooling, assembly, and test activities.
In this area we missed 29 IPE's or 16.8%. The
fabrication cycle IPE performance miss ratio
of 29/172 compared to the engineering IPE
performance miss ratio of 3/130 (reference Table
C) indicates that meeting fabrication events is
considerably more difficult. A considerable
amount of "domino impact" (in which missing one
event on a PERT subnet led to missing subsequent
events on that same subnet) was noted in the
fabrication area. Here the process of procure
ment available, build complete, and test complete
forms a tight series arrangement. On the other
hand, in the engineering area, the IPE's were
predominately design release events composed of
several engineering packages in a parallel
relationship. For example, basic structure,
bracketry, plumbing, and installation drawings
might be the four major packages comprising a
structures 1 engineering IPE. If, in order to
prepare a drawing for this IPE the structures
group needed information that interfaced with
part of an IPE that the propulsion group was
working, the engineers invariably arranged among
themselves to expedite the drawings containing
such interface data. This parallel flexibility
is much less available among fabrication events
whose end items are in a series arrangement and
usually physically different. (in the few
instances where there was similarity between two
items of hardware, in a close time/availability
relationship, they were invariably a part of the
same IPE.)

Milestones
The second part of Martin*s schedule incentive
deals with the contract milestones. These are
the on-time and successful completion of the
combined systems tests of the seventeen space
boosters and the tests of the three sets of
AGE vans prior to shipment to the field. These
major contract delivery dates or milestones were
set forth in our proposal in September 1962.
They were then "frozen" into the contract when
go ahead was received in late December 1962.
Milestone performance to date is shown in Table E.
TABLE E.

Milestones
Scored
AGE Van Sets

Milestones
Approved by
the Monitors

3

Space Boosters
Totals to Date

Milestones
Disapproved
0

15

!*

18

2*

(*Space Boosters 1 and 2)

The impact of changes on IPE's is easily handled
through the application of the criteria via the
bilateral incentive monitoring system. The
contract provides that in the event a Class I
change impacts upon an IPE already fixed in a
Quarterly Catalog the monitors will temporarily
excuse the event to allow appropriate recovery
action by the contractor. Upon receipt of
contractual direction to perform a Class I change,
the Martin planners "PERT" the change, the revised
date is given a critical review by the monitors,
and Martin performance is measured against the
new PERT expected date. Class II changes impact
ing on an IPE generate no incentive relief to
Martin, The milestones are changed only by a
supplemental agreement to the contract. This
occurred in mid-program when the remaining mile
stones were rescheduled in order to accommodate
the addition of live payloads to the flight
program.

Despite this lack of flexibility the motivation
generated by IPE's is present in the fabrication
area, and as Graph D shows, the cumulative trend
of missed IPE's has become level.
GRAPH D.

CONTRACT MILESTONE SCORING

FABRICATION CUMULATIVE IPE PERFORMANCE
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Program Schedule Success
Before leaving the subject of incentives we must
recall that the purpose for having schedule
incentives is to have the equipment ready at the
launch complex on time. This purpose has been
met. All Martin Titan III equipment has been
ready for customer use at the launch site on his
planned launch dates.
Flight Performance
There is an old truism that "the proof of the
pudding is in the eating". In Martin's Titan III
development contract the largest proportion of
the incentive reward or penalty has been placed
upon flight performance. This is a two type
incentive.
1

2

3
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First Flight Incentive
The first type of flight performance incentive
is that placed upon successful and on-time
launch of the first "A" (core only) booster
and the first "C" (core plus solids) booster.
This is a reward only incentive and in order
for Martin to win we must be on schedule to the
contract launch date and the transtage must
meet its final orbital window as specified in
the contract. As added motivation for proper
accomplishment of Martin's role as detailed
integration contractor we lose just as much if
our associates 1 equipment fails as we lose if
our equipment fails in achieving the specified
orbit. The advantage of this type of incentive
is that it motivates teamwork.

The performance of the Titan III "A" on its
first two flights encouraged the mission
planners to add satellite payloads to vehicle
3 "A" and 4 "A". These payloads were success
fully placed into orbit. Then, the success of
the maiden flight of the Titan III "C" further
encouraged the planners to schedule satellite
payloads for all of the remaining Titan III "C"
development flights. The use of live payloads
with their complex flight profiles necessitated
a change in the Space Booster Demonstration
incentive to give emphasis to this element of
program growth. Therefore, the Air Force and
Martin added a satellite orbital insertion mea
surement to the flight performance incentives.

Space Booster Demonstration Incentive

Cost Performance

The second part of Martin's flight performance
incentive is assigned to the operation of the
Martin equipment in the countdown and flight of
the other fifteen vehicles in the program. In
this incentive the countdown and flight opera
tion of each vehicle is worth 100 points. 3 At
the end of the flight program the points earned
are converted to dollars of fee reward or
penalty. As the number of vehicles launched
increases, the point emphasis shifts toward
the successful operation of the final stage.
This progressive distribution of points requires
improved performance on each of these develop
ment flights in order to avoid penalty.

Martin's Titan III Phase II contract has already
passed the 9070 cost commitment and expenditure
point. We can confidently state that upon con
tract completion we will be on the target cost.
Although the cost incentive structure in the
contract presented an opportunity for signifi
cant cost incentive rewards if the program were
underrun, we will not be able to produce the pro
gram for less than target cost. On the other
hand, we have avoided the penalties inherent
if we were to significantly overrun the target
cost. This exactitude in meeting the target cost
did not come by accident. During Phase I great
effort was expended in preparing the detailed
engineering specifications, in preparing and
testing the PERT/Time/Cost system, in establish
ing the management plan, in defining the specific
detailed items of work in each of the contract
tasks, and in preparing the cost estimate for
Phase II. Furthermore, once under the Phase II
contract we found, as we had planned, that the
IPE schedule incentive motivated people to com
plete their work promptly. As soon as they did
they were, in accordance with PERT/Cost, operating
on a new cost suffix (and budget) for their next
event. The rigid time/completion requirements
of IPE's also helped to avoid costly delays and
rework downstream on the program. In addition,
Martin has an effective cost reduction program
in which the Titan III program team was credited
with over $80 million in savings during this
three year period. An additional sum of over
$7.5 million was saved by the Value Engineering
program. In fact, but for the IPE's and the cost
reduction programs the tight target cost would
have been overrun. Furthermore, during this
period we experienced a decline in sales at Denver
and management had to work vigorously to keep the
overhead in line.

Results
The Flight performance to date is shown in the
following table:
TABLE F.

FLIGHT PERFORMANCE

Percent of Primary and
Secondary Flight Objectives Met

Ratio of Incentives
Earned to Incentives
Allocated to that
Flight

907.
100%
1007.
100%
1007.
817.
90%

07.
100%
100%
100%
100%
Not Yet Established
Not Yet Established

All countdown points have been successfully earned
by Martin.
Indicative of the successful performance of the
Titan III "A" vehicle is the fact that the
government deleted the fifth core vehicle from
the "A" configuration flight program and has
reserved it for future use, thus saving
$17,000,000 of the taxpayer's money. ^

Both AFSSD and Martin management teamed to curb
the change activity inherent in a development pro
gram. This management effort combined with the
excellent program definition obtained during Phase
I contributed to our success in holding the cost
impact of specification changes to less than 1%
of the target cost. These concepts of accurate
definition and stringent control were also applied
to the modifications of the contract work state
ment for such items as the addition of live payloads to the flight test program.

The first flight of the Titan III "C" was a
complete success. The second and third flights
experienced difficulties in the final phases
of flight and did not achieve the planned final
orbital position.
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Conclusion
Martin's successful experiences on the Titan III
program prove that incentives do work towards
motivating superior performance. Our experi
ences also show that success is contingent upon;
(1) an excellent degree of program definition;
and, (2) the ability of management to bring all
their people on board as wholehearted partici
pants.
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